Building on new behavioral theories, using a data set of about 450 variables and augmenting the Sala-i-Martin definition of robustness, we find evidence in support of the hypothesis that the standard causes of the shadow economy (SE), taxes, the administrative burden and labor market regulations, are not per se crucial in determining the size of the SE. Many of the robust influences emanate from relatively new theories such as elements of direct democracy, social interaction effects, and happiness, and from the institutional literature on the relative importance of specific institutions for economic performance. Most of them can well be affected by governments. Hence, if one believes the SE to be a problem in high income industrial countries, governments could address it through many ways, including their own behavior. And these could be more successful than a strategy built on more government control, increased punishment and less freedom, as adopted by some OECD countries. Simulations of the size of the SE demonstrate their sensitivity to the required velocity assumption and show that previous estimates, including those of the so-called Mimic model, appear to be based on very high velocity assumptions. A moderate velocity assumption yields macro estimates of the SE consistent with the micro evidence, i.e. not more than a few percent of official GDP. Finally, for the first time, we separate the relatively large 'crime-related' shadow activity from the 'non-criminal' one. . 2 This includes GDP, GDP in PPP, population, price indices, various employment, non-employment and unemployment measures, interest rates etc. 3 1 -constitution, 2 -tax-and social security burden, 3 -administrative burden, 4 -quality of administration and justice system, 5 -economic institutions (including labor market regulation), 6 -values/moral, and 7 -other influences and subjective factors.
Introduction
There are important gaps in the SE literature, which this paper attempts to address:
• politicians increasingly criticized tax avoidance and 'unsocial behavior' and implemented measures to increase control of economic activity, raised the punishment level for tax violations and pressured countries with liberal tax laws to abolish their bank secrecy laws; but it is unclear whether this is a good policy; • the organized-crime related SE is not separated from other SE activity;
• the empirical literature assumes few major standard causes of the SE, i.e. the tax and regulatory burden, often augmented by selected variables of interest such as specific institutional indicators. But it would be valuable for policy purposes to know in detail which taxes and regulatory aspects are relevant and what their relative quantitative impact is compared to all other potential influences, where quantified data are available. This is especially relevant because economic research extends more and more into the area of morality, social norms, social capital, and happiness, and finds strong evidence in experiments for social interactions such as pro-social behavior, reciprocity and fairness effects (e.g. Fortin et al., 2007; Carpenter & Matthews, 2004; Dohmen et al., 2009;  and the overview by Riedl, 2010) . Thus, we aim for a systematic overview of institutional characteristics and all other potentially relevant influences showing the quantitative influence in each case through an extreme bounds analysis; • hypotheses of conditional effects appear especially relevant in SE analyses because taxes, for instance, may well promote the SE, but this may depend on other factors such as the satisfaction of tax payers with the quality of public services they receive. This suggests testing for conditional effects through interaction models or other means, which are, however, lacking in empirical analyses of the SE. • often, the currency or MIMIC model-estimated ratios of the SE to official GDP, which are very large relative to most micro-evidence, are presented without showing both their sensitivity to the required velocity of currency assumption and information about the underlying estimated currency demand equations; • the critique of relatively high estimates of the SE is increasing and this resulted in subsequent corrections by authors. For instance, for Australia, estimates of the SE of about 15% of official GDP were corrected and new estimates proposed, which were up to two thirds less than before. But these were again criticized as flawed due to double counting, after which they were withdrawn from publication (see Breusch, 2006) .
The remainder of the paper is as follows: Section 2 describes both the structuring of our data and the estimated models. Section 3 presents the empirical results with regard to the analyzed influences, estimated sizes of the SE and their sensitivity and section 5 concludes. For reasons of space, the detailed result tables of the The Shadow Economy in International Comparison 483 large regression output for each variable and of the simulations were not included here but are available in the long paper version (Thießen, 2010) .
Data, Definition, and Models
Our data set includes a maximum of 38 countries, which are all OECD countries and eight Eastern European countries. 1 We use the OECD database for standard macroeconomic variables 2 and the IFS and ECB statistics for monetary aggregates. To structure our analysis we propose seven major categories of variables. 3 Under these categories we summarized the theories related to shadow economic activity (see Thießen, 2010, section 2, pp. 4-12) . Then we attempted to consider all available data sources to find proxies for these many variables, including survey data, yielding a total of more than 20 sources and about 450 variables. Admittedly, this is not to say that the data are in each case fully satisfying, but this magnitude allows a robustness analysis not performed before (see the detailed variable list in Thießen, 2010, Appendix 1, 'indicators and sources') . Regarding indicators of the shadow economy, this study is aimed at using alternatives to the most used one, currency in circulation (relative either to the population or to M2). However, despite all efforts, currency remained the only indicator with satisfying availability and comparable quality over the chosen countries and years (see Thießen, 2010, pp. 12-13 and Appendix 2, for details). Given this indicator, our definition of the SE is already determined because only those 'underground' transactions can be considered that are carried out using currency.
The period chosen, 1991-2007 , is the result of attempting to collect long-run data while at the same time considering 'soft' variables of theoretical importance, which have been available in quantitative form only since relatively recently, such as preferences of economic agents, their views, for instance, on the quality of public services, on the complexity of the tax system, on corruption and so on. In addition, detailed data on the tax burden and labor market characteristics are available only since about the early 1990s. The frequency is annual.
However, since several important variables and especially the survey data have considerable gaps, the data were averaged over the sample period with only one observation per country. In the best case this is a long run average but for some variables, admittedly, the availability of the data limits this interpretation. A large number of preliminary estimations were run to test elaborate functional forms, 484 U. Thießen especially including interaction terms so as to test conditional models, as discussed in the underlying long version of this paper. The estimated sign of the interaction term was, however, highly unstable. Despite further efforts to reduce the specification and using different functional forms and logs of the variables, this problem persisted. Hence, there was no alternative but to leave this inclusion of an interaction term for future research. This preliminary work demonstrated the need for specification as parsimonious as possible. Our used base model thus is: C i /M2 i = a 0 + a 1 X i + a 2 k i + a 3 m i + e i (1) ( 1) where X is a vector of the determinants of the currency to M2 ratio as suggested by monetary theory, 4 k represents either one of the 42 tax and social security burden variables of our second group in the table of variables (Thießen, 2010, Appendix 1) , or one of the over 30 labor market variables of the fifth group. Indicator m represents all other influences, i.e. constitutional aspects, complexity of the tax system, administrative burden, quality of administration and justice system, economic institutions except labor market indicators, values and moral aspects, and subjective factors and other influences. Up to 200 variables were used for m in all. Also, on account of the findings of the preliminary estimations, we abstained from any transformation of the data. The regressions were run employing OLS but also using 2SLS and GMM since regressors could be endogenous. Given the large number of combinations of the two groups of k variables (the many tax and social security burden variables and labor market characteristics) with the m variables, equation (2) allows analyzing the influences on the shadow economy to a degree of detail not performed before. The resulting large regression output required an automated evaluation through special excel programs. 5 The results were condensed in a two-step procedure: the first step is a summary of the results for each variable of interest (the respective k variable regarding taxes, labor market variables and other influences) whose robustness is tested in up to 200 regressions for each of the three estimation methods. An indicator was defined to be robust (relatively significant) if in the majority of cases in each of the three estimation methods the same sign was obtained and if this sign was statistically significant -at least at the 10% significance level -in 30% or more of the cases of at least one estimation method. 6 The results of the first step can 4 Following the Keynesian liquidity preference we include the volume of transactions proxied by real GDP per capita and the real short-term interest rate. 5 These programs were produced by Pierre Wohlleben. Regarding our main dependent variable C/M2 about 64,000 regressions were evaluated. 6 The best accepted definition of robustness is that of Sala-i-Martin (1997) , which stipulates that the 90% interval (between the 5th and 95th percentile) in the distribution of a parameter does not include zero. The distribution is derived, however, from estimating the variable of interest using all possible combinations of variables, including non-plausible ones. And only the estimated sign matters for robustness, not the significance. Our definition is somewhat more restrictive because we consider not only the estimated sign but also the significance. In addition, our estimation set does not include all possible combinations of variables. Hence, it is possible for an indicator to be 'Sala-i-Martin robust' but not according to our definition, and vice versa. For a comparison of our definition with that of Sala-i-Martin and a discussion corroborating our definition see the already cited underlying full version of this paper.
The Shadow Economy in International Comparison 485 be found in the underlying discussion paper. In a second step, a ranking of the robust indicators regarding taxes, labor market indicators and other influences was prepared using the average beta coefficient of all three estimation methods. Regarding simulations of the size of the SE, we use, however, an augmented version of equation (1) where we include an indicator of serious crime (Cr) so as to be able to separate the estimated 'crime-based' or 'criminal' SE from the 'non-crime based' SE, and we include the two dummies for Eastern European countries and regarding the Euro introduction, respectively:
Empirical Results

Tax and Social Security Burden
To save space, the results of our analysis of the first major group of potential causes of the shadow economy, the tax and social security burden, are shown in detail only in Thießen (2010, Table 2 ). Here, we show only the rankings of robust indicators based on beta coefficients (Table 1) and some interesting indicators not found robust as memorandum items.
The association between our fiscal indicators (tax burden, social security burden, transfers and subsidies) and the SE is generally positive. A few tax indicators have a robust positive sign independent of the estimation method. This refers to the social security burden of employers, the total tax wedge in broad definitions, subsidies and transfers, taxes on international trade and government size.
Noteworthy is that the many tax wedge measures are consistently pointing to higher taxation promoting the SE. There is no difference in the relative importance of marginal versus average tax rates.
Indirect taxes also have an estimated generally positive sign, although not significant. Given the below-proposed move to a simplified and consumptionbased tax system, this result would be welcomed. 7 The evidence regarding direct personal taxes is inconsistent and thus inconclusive. Finally, there are several 'specialized' taxes with a consistently estimated negative sign, suggesting a negative association of these taxes with the SE, such as property taxes, taxation of interest income, financial and capital transactions, and corporate and business taxes. For the first three taxes the negative sign is robust but corporate and business taxes do not have a robust impact on the SE.
The negative sign of taxation of interest income and of financial and capital transactions, which is robust regarding the former, is unexpected because it suggests that these taxes dampen currency demand and the shadow economy. It was expected that such taxes would c.p. cause capital outflows through exporting domestic currency and thus higher demand for currency and higher shadow economic activity. However, a plausible explanation is that demand deposits and/or foreign currency are used in realizing capital outflows, i.e. demand for domestic currency decreases. And this effect is amplified by a negative impact of capital outflows on investment and output. Hence, the decreased demand for domestic currency in response to such taxation may be associated with capital outflows
The Shadow Economy in International Comparison 487 and reduced output. Thus, the interpretation of the negative sign of taxation is ambiguous. Nevertheless, the impact on domestic currency demand of these taxes is negative and robust. 8 Overall, it stands out that broad measures of the tax and social security burden, subsidies and other transfers, and government size have an estimated positive, robust impact on the SE. This points to the importance of the general tax burden as a potential cause for shadow economic activity rather than particular taxes. And the results do not support the recommendation to favor indirect taxes over direct taxes as part of a strategy to reduce shadow economic activities.
Labor Market Characteristics
For reasons of space we again report not the detailed results but only the ranking of the influences found to be robust ( Table 2) . Starting with the most difficult issue of labor market regulation, the three indicators of overall labor market regulation (LMR), which are labor freedom (Heritage), labor market rigidity index (Rama and Artecona, 2002) , and labor market regulations (Fraser), all point in the same direction: higher LMR increases the shadow economy or, in other words, higher labor market flexibility reduces the SE. Of the three indices, the World Bank rigidity index of Rama and Artecona (2002) is relatively highly statistically significant and robust.
This result of a positive association between LMR and the shadow economy is intuitively plausible and confirms both the older and young theories of LMR (see the discussion in the long version of this paper Thießen, 2010, p. 21) . However, regarding policy conclusions, three issues need to be considered. 9 Notwithstanding these qualifications, the estimated quantitative impact of labor market indicators ranks relatively high in Table 2 , taking the places 5, 7, 8 The robust sign of our proxy for interest income taxation may be an incentive to examine the motives behind the recently uncovered cases of tax evasion in industrial countries through holding savings abroad in countries with an effective bank secrecy law (Switzerland, Luxembourg, Liechtenstein, etc) . Often, the motive was not merely to save taxes but: (a) people's fear of being expropriated through government action such as inflation, (b) the hiding of funds from business partners, and (c) inheritances of formerly not declared savings. But the motives may also concern the tax system, e.g. the intertemporal distortion of taxing savings, which is double taxation of formerly taxed income. The move to dual taxation and moderate capital income tax rates can mitigate the problem but it distorts the financial structure of firms. The via regia (best solution) would be the move to a neutral corporate and personal income tax within a simplified tax system (e.g. Boadway & Bruce, 1984; Nguyen-Than & Rose, 2004; Rose & Petersen, 2004) . The first OECD country going in this direction by recently introducing an allowance for corporate equity was Belgium (Gerard, 2006) . 9 First, the results pertain to averages and the countries differ in the details of their labor market regulations. Deregulating one or more elements may have possibly offsetting feedback effects on other indicators. For instance, deregulating the hiring and firing rules will probably be associated with raising the short run social assistance for unemployed, which influences the SE positively (see Table 3 ). Second, for countries with a relatively high degree of labor market flexibility (e.g. USA, Mexico) this finding is of little help, because even if they would raise the degree of labor market flexibility further, the resulting reduction in the SE would tend to be small. Third, the quantitative impact of labor market liberalization in reducing the SE can be very different among the countries. Hence, each country would need to analyze further in what respect and in which combination with other measures labor market liberalization may in fact contribute to reducing the SE. No data available for important countries, e.g. Canada, all Scandinavian countries, UK, USA. * * * Indicators not robust according to the used definition.
Source: Own estimates. 9, 13, 14, and 15. It means that LMR comes in third place following the unemployment indicators, and labor force participation rates and disregarding for a moment employee participation rights and trade union membership. The unemployment rate (OECD data) has a relatively highly statistically significant and robust estimated positive sign. Therefore, it is top ranking in Table 2 among the labor market indicators. In fact, this estimated sign may be considered a test of reliability of the chosen dependent variable. Related to unemployment measures is 'vulnerable employment', first ranking in Table 2 , defined as unpaid family workers and own-account workers as a percentage of employment. Its estimated sign is consistently negative and statistically significant, suggesting that own-account working and shadow economic activity are close substitutes. This underlines the plausible policy implication that facilitation of officially recognized own-account working and incentives to pay family workers would dampen the SE.
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Surprisingly, the association between the labor participation rate and the SE is robustly positive. It ranks in third place (Table 2 ). This positive association has an interesting background: the male and the female participation rates of Rama and Artecona (2002) have estimated opposite signs, namely positive for females and negative for males. This would suggest that the estimated positive impact of the overall participation rate comes from female participation, which would be consistent with the empirical evidence of females facing disadvantages at the official labor market and therefore would at least have an incentive to turn more easily to unofficial activity. The policy conclusion would be that policies aiming at equal opportunities for woman or affirmative action for woman regarding their hiring would reduce the SE.
Turning to the indicators employee participation rights and trade union membership, great care must be taken not to misinterpret the estimated significant positive sign.
As seen in the theoretical overview (Thießen, 2010 , section 2), it can be argued that labor participation rights slow down management decisions and result in higher costs, less competitiveness of enterprises, and both higher unemployment and shadow economic activity than otherwise. However, the overwhelming part of the empirical literature on this issue, namely usually individual country studies, does not find significant negative but rather positive effects of labor participation rights on economic performance, for instance, on productivity (e.g. Fitzroy & Kraft, 2005) . 10 The theoretical expectation regarding trade union membership is also theoretically ambiguous. The estimated consistently positive signs of the two indicators of trade union membership are therefore unexpected. However, they are mostly statistically insignificant so that we cannot corroborate either hypothesis.
The three remaining labor market indicators are replacement rates for the unemployed, labor market programs and labor conflicts. It is often hypothesized that the effect of replacement rates on the SE is positive due to some misuse of social assistance. Indeed, there is some evidence for this, because the replacement rate for the initial phase of unemployment has a consistently positive estimated sign. One explanation could be that unemployment benefits may be used for some short run period as a supplement to unofficial income. The result for labor market programs is unexpected because the estimated sign is mostly positive, albeit not robust. If labor market programs would fulfill their goal, the sign should be significantly negative. Hence, this evidence should be taken as a call to improve these programs. The last indicator concerns labor conflicts and shows that workdays lost are clearly contributing to the SE. Thus, policies aiming at mitigating such conflicts would reduce the SE. 10 The index of employee participation rights used here is the first attempt to condense the available information on these rights in the 38 countries of this study (see the publications of the European Trade Union Institute, ETUI, in Brussels), in an index on a scale with merely three units. This is the first time a cross-section index has been constructed. Labor participation rights differ highly among the countries, are a very complex issue due to the many facets involved, and even when there are no formal rights, the degree of effective labor participation may be higher than in countries with such rights given that they are difficult to be enforced and can be undermined. Hence, further work on this index is required to increase its reliability.
U. Thießen
Comparing the quantitative impact of the labor market indicators ( Table 2) with that of the tax indicators (Table 1) , shows that the latter have a somewhat higher average impact. But the impact is even stronger regarding several of the following other institutional characteristics and subjective factors, most notably corruption and life satisfaction indicators.
Other Institutional Characteristics and Subjective Factors
Most noteworthy about the analysis of the remaining potential influences on the SE 11 (167 variables in all) is that almost all of them have the expected sign. The few unexpected signs can well be explained. Moreover, the estimated quantitative impact of several of these additional influences is relatively large: as can be seen, the top ranking influences in Table 3 have considerably higher average beta coefficients compared with those of the tax burden (Table 1 ) and labor market characteristics (Table 2) , respectively. This supports the hypothesis that shadow economic activity is conditional on many factors. Hence, if former empirical studies on the SE argued that the consideration of only one or few potential causes of the SE (like taxes and regulatory burden) means that the estimated size of the SE is underestimated, this may leave out potentially important dampening factors of the SE.
The signs of the robust indicators are plausible and consistent with theory (with one exception, the desire of people for higher income equality, which is discussed below). We summarize the results by going through the subgroups to which the individual indices belong. The reader is asked to browse through Table 3 (and the detailed results shown in Thießen, 2010, Table 6, pp. 27-31) to find influences of her/his special interest and the respective estimated impact.
A possible objection to these findings is that given the relatively large number of indices used in this study it can be an artifact if one finds several of them to have the 'correct' -i.e. expected -and even robust sign. However, with few exceptions the estimated signs within the individual subgroups are consistent and within each subgroup several (in the case of corruption, all) of the indicators are relatively significant and not merely a small percentage of them.
Six subgroups did not have robust results and thus were not included in Table 3 , namely the innovation potential, religion, globalization, inequality of income, gender, and population structure. Noteworthy is also the order of the ranking in Table 3 . For instance, the administrative burden, commonly assumed to be of high importance, ranks substantially behind other factors.
These other factors may -until now -have been thought to be of little or no importance for the SE in wealthy countries, such as corruption, quality of the justice system, feeling of happiness, quality of administration, and the perception of state and enterprise representatives by economic agents. But these factors rank not only before taxes and the administrative burden but also considerably above other important influences such as tax enforcement, punishment, availability of credit, educational system and the constitutional system. 
U. Thießen
All five indices of the top ranking group of corruption suggest that it fuels shadow economic activity. Given the theoretical debate about whether corruption is a complement or a substitute to the shadow economy (see the theoretical overview, section 2, indicator group 'values and moral', in Thießen, 2010) , our finding supports the view that corruption and the SE are complementary and thus a substitute for the official economy, not only in low income countries as suggested by Dreher and Schneider (2006) , but also in high income countries. Given the many forms of corruption occurring, especially in relatively rich industrial countries as documented, for instance, in the reports by transparency international, governments should use this result as further evidence of the importance to improve institutions so as to reduce incentives for corruption in the first place rather than raising punishment and fines, which may be ineffective. 12 Second ranking is our indicator of happiness. This high rank corresponds to the increasing attention received by the economics of happiness and attempts to augment GDP by 'happiness' (e.g. Kahneman & Krueger, 2006) . 13 Specifically, the indicators 'happiness' and 'satisfaction with life' are second and third ranking in Table 3 and second and fourth in the overall ranking. In our country sample, happiness is highly positively correlated with per capita income, but happiness is not highest in the richest countries. It is highest in the relatively small island countries -Iceland, New Zealand and Ireland (using the two decades before the crisis of 2009). Indeed, Iceland and New Zealand have very small estimated shadow economies.
Third ranking is the quality of justice system (subgroup of group 4 in the list of indicators). This further corroborates the hypothesis of seeing the standard assumed causes of the SE as conditional, because the impact of, for instance, a relatively high tax burden on the SE may be mitigated by high quality of the justice system, administration and other factors. For instance, the indices of this subgroup -judicial independence, integrity of the legal system, irregular payments in judicial decisions and impartial courts -are highly ranked in Table 3, all showing that higher quality reduces the SE. Interestingly, the topic of the quality of the justice system in wealthy countries has been taken up relatively recently by theorists (Glaeser et al., 2000) and empiricists (Aaken et al., 2008) , who draw analogous conclusions (see the theoretical overview in section 2, Thießen, 2010) . Even in the wealthy countries there appears to be ample room for improvement of the perceptions of people regarding the quality of the justice system. 14 Fourth ranking is property rights protection. The robust property rights protection indices in Table 3 rank on places 6, 30, and 45 and have an estimated negative association with the SE. They tend to have higher ranks of robustness in reducing the SE than our two indicators of 'contracting institutions' or 'contract 12 Note that many cases of corruption in wealthy countries are often related to government budgets. 13 In the underlying discussion paper it is argued that 'happiness' is not a sufficient condition for a relatively small SE, see Thießen (2010, p. 33) . 14 Examples may be dependent state prosecutors (Aaken et al., 2008) and the cases of CEO's being acquitted (often through 'voluntary' payments) despite fraudulent breach of trust to the disadvantage of shareholders ('manager capitalism'), whereas the courts confirm the dismissal of long-serving employees without notice even for trivial offenses. law', which supports private contracts ('regulation of entry', rank 38, and 'number of legal procedures to collect an unpaid check', rank 54). This is consistent with the institutional economics literature, which found property rights to be relatively more important in explaining long-run economic growth than contracting institutions or contract law (Acemoglu & Johnson, 2005) .
Fifth, sixth, and eighth ranking in Table 3 are indicators, which are very similar to each other: 'quality of state representatives', 'quality of administration', and 'quality of enterprise representatives', underlining the importance of perceptions of economic agents for the SE regarding the actions of people in power, foremost those in public office. 15 The findings show that the perception of government effectiveness, judicial impartiality, quality of both state and enterprise representatives are relatively high ranking influences on the SE in wealthy OECD countries. Hence, using the ample room for improvements in these areas could contribute in the medium term to reducing the SE, which may be particularly interesting after events like the financial crisis and recession of 2008-2009 since it is clear to taxpayers that they bear the costs. 16 Socioeconomic conditions have the seventh rank with an estimated quantitative impact of about the same size as the second ranking tax and labor market indicators. Their improvement reduces the SE.
The administrative burden belongs with taxes to the standard causes of the SE in most of the relevant empirical literature. In our ranking (Table 3) , the highest ranking indicator of this subgroup is 'business freedom' in 15th place. Other indicators of this subgroup rank considerably lower, i.e. extra payments/bribes 15 Examples of the many robust indicators in this group are 'favoritism in decisions of government officials' (rank 8), 'ethical behavior of firms' (13), 'diversion of public funds to companies, etc' (14), 'government effectiveness' (16), 'irregular payments in public contracts' (18), 'quality of information regarding changes in policies and regulations' (20) etc. The surprisingly large number of scandals involving managements of big enterprises during the past decade and the financial crisis of 2008/09 may be an incentive to analyze better the effective degree of openness and competition of markets for enterprise managers and supervisory board members to dampen problems of 'manager capitalism'. 16 The case of the financial crisis of 2008/09 may be an example of poor perceived government effectiveness: international organizations (especially the IMF and the BIS with its 'Institute for Financial Stability', IFS) and national financial supervisory institutions (central banks together with other supervisory institutions) had a mandate -which was made even more explicit after the Asian financial crisis of 1997 -to effectively monitor the stability of the financial system. But despite warnings from scientists in 2006 and 2007, even delivered at IMF headquarter and at meetings of central bank governors at the BIS (e.g. New York Times, 2006 on Roubini's warnings; and White, 2006), these institutions failed to propose and to take any action before the crisis. Ironically, the crisis gave the IMF more power and saved it from having to reduce its staff, because prior to the crisis demand for its loans decreased. Although some of these institutions usually emphasize the importance of personal responsibility, such consequences affecting them did not become known. Governments have also not been able to internationally coordinate substantive regulatory reforms despite elaborate proposals from scientists. On the EU level, a necessary institution to effectively coordinate economic policies is still missing. Moreover, some governments have not reformed exceptions concerning financial supervision (e.g. in Germany among the largest loss making institutions in the financial crisis of 2008/09 were state-owned or state-related banks). These are merely a few examples that may indicate room for governments to improve their perceived effectiveness. 496 U. Thießen (33), the burden of government regulation (51), and administrative requirements (57). All of them show that a higher burden promotes the SE.
One particular goal of this study was to analyze the influence of the constitution, in particular elements of direct democracy, which, to the best of our knowledge, were not yet analyzed in a cross-section panel, since only one OECD country, Switzerland, has this political system of a direct democracy. Since other countries have elements of direct democracy, we use indicators of these elements. All of the four available indicators show that it reduces the SE; two of them are robust, namely 'democratic accountability' and 'political action signing a petition', which are ranked 24th and 43rd, respectively. The eight tested constitutional system indicators show that polity scores and indicators for political stability and rule of law have a dampening effect on the SE, where half of them are robust.
The subgroup values and moral is the next ranking. The first two of its indicators, 'government should allow more freedom for individuals' (rank 27), and 'impact of nepotism' (37), have robust positive signs, indicating that dissatisfaction of people with their freedom and nepotism tend to promote the SE. By contrast, the indicators 'spend time with friends' (32), and 'family important in life' (53) have robust and expected negative signs, showing that sociality reduces the SE. The indicator 'income equality should be made more equal' (66) is presumably highly correlated with the degree of inequality. It has a negative sign although theory predicts higher income inequality to push up the SE (see Appendix 1, Section 2). Other indicators of income inequality are insignificant. An admittedly tentative explanation of this unexpected negative sign could be that as the income distribution is felt to become disturbingly uneven, people nevertheless may have benefited from more liberal markets through employment opportunities in the official economy, which would reduce the SE.
Another major goal of this paper was to test whether the quality and quantity of public services is a conditional factor to the burden of taxes. Although this could not be tested through use of interaction models, the respective subgroup of indicators is relatively highly ranked on the 12th place in Table 3 . All of the first seven indicators in this subgroup have a negative sign, meaning that higher quality and quantity reduces the SE. 17 Overall, this result is taken as supporting the hypothesis that governments can regard the quality of public services as a conditional factor to the tax burden.
Of the remaining indicator subgroups in Table 3 we comment a few results, some of which may be quite interesting.
Organized crime is promoting the SE, a plausible result that enables us to estimate below the crime-related part of the shadow economy.
Regarding punishment, there is only a relatively weak indicator available (prisoners to population), which shows a robust, positive effect on the SE. Of course, all results of these estimations need to be cautiously interpreted but this surprising result is nevertheless consistent with the new theory on punishment and tax morale (see Appendix 1, Section 5, last subgroup punishment). This literature argues theoretically and empirically that punishment needs to be seen as critical, especially regarding minor offenses, if it is supposed to be successful in reducing offenses (e.g. Fees & Wohlschlegel, 2009; Feld & Frey, 2002; Tyran & Feld, 2005) .
Taken at face value, the positive sign says that punishment does not help in reducing the SE but even contributes to it. This emphasizes the need for looking for alternatives to recent policies of OECD countries to increase punishment levels for shadow economic activity and tax evasion.
Decentralization has a theoretically ambiguous effect on the SE (see Theoretical overview, Section 2, Thießen, 2010, Subgroup 4 ). On the one hand, it can reduce the revenue maximizing behavior of governments, thus dampening the SE. On the other hand, it may result in more corruption, higher influence of interest groups, and lower quality of government decisions, which would tend to promote the SE. Given an estimated positive robust sign of our proxy for decentralization (degree of decentralization assessed by executives selected by the World Economic Forum), we find support for the second theoretical view, i.e. decentralization promotes the SE. It would be plausible if corruption is a main channel from decentralization to the SE, given its high positive correlation with the SE.
For tax enforcement, ranked 19th, a negative sign was expected, if it has a deterrence effect and if it does not cause adverse reactions of people that may over-compensate deterrence. Indeed, two of the three indicators have a robust negative sign, i.e. 'tax auditors per taxpayer' (rank 62) and 'tax administration staff per taxpayer' (67). However, a surprising and interesting result is the estimated positive robust sign of the tax enforcement indicator 'verification activities per taxpayer' (49), suggesting that verification activities promote the SE. This result can be plausible and consistent with the theory and new experimental empirical evidence as discussed in the underlying discussion paper (p. 36).
The 20th ranked subgroup complexity of the tax system has a positive robust sign, supporting the theoretical view that complexity increases perceived unfairness, uncertainty, and can even undermine the constitution. Thus, the opposing theoretical possibility for tax complexity to reduce the SE through use of tax loopholes and promotion of legal tax avoidance appears to be overcompensated. Finally, the educational system has the expected negative and robust sign, which is a pleasant result, since endeavors to raise the level of education will dampen the SE although the quantitative impact is one of the lowest of the robust variables in Table 3 .
Estimated Size of the Shadow Economy and Causes
The estimates are directly proportional to the value of the assumed income velocity. Hence, they are highly sensitive to it and thus only indicative. For reasons of space the discussion of the velocity assumption is offered in Appendix 1. Recently there has been a rebirth of estimates of the SE using structural models, so-called Mimic models (multiple indicators and multiple causes, first applied to the SE by Frey & Weck-Hannemann, 1984) . However, a Mimic model generates an index of the SE whose transformation to ratios of the SE to official GDP necessitates using other estimates of SE ratios as benchmarks, which are usually taken from studies using the currency method. Hence, SE size estimates on the basis of a Mimic model are directly tied to a currency model besides their own problems (Breusch, 2005a (Breusch, , 2005b (Breusch, , 2006 . But Mimic model papers usually do not provide such details.
Appendix 1 demonstrates criticism of choosing a relatively high value of velocity because this overstates the work the currency does in the generation of observed income (e.g. Breusch, 2005a, p. 33) . Moreover, there is a clear declining trend of velocity. Appendix 2 discusses which velocity assumption is consistent with the micro evidence on the size of the SE: it suggests choosing a relatively low velocity such as M2. This assumption yields scenario I shown in Appendix 3.
It is thus interesting to see that both discussions, which are independent of each other (Appendices 1 and 2) suggest scenario I (Appendix 3) as the only one that is consistent with both. To save space, the estimation results of equation (2) are shown and discussed in the underlying paper (Thießen, 2010, Table 8, p. 38) . For the simulations only the statistically significant independent variables of the chosen model were considered, i.e. the variables organized crime, administrative burden, tax burden, social security burden and the quality of public services. The results of three scenarios demonstrate their sensitivity to the velocity assumption: the estimates in scenario III are about three times higher than those in scenario I, although we chose only from a medium range of velocities (M2 velocity used in scenario I, and a weighted average of M1 and currency velocity in scenario III, which reproduces Schneider's estimates for Germany).
Summarizing briefly the main features of these scenarios we find that in industrial countries the SE related to organized crime tends to be roughly about half of the estimated total SE with some exceptions. The estimated organized crimerelated SE tends to be higher in Eastern European and developing countries compared with industrial countries. 18 The relatively low estimates of the SE in Scandinavian countries confirm one main hypothesis of this paper, that a relatively high tax burden is not necessarily resulting in a high SE but this is conditional on many other factors of which, for technical reasons, only very few can be considered in these simulations.
Another lesson is that the SE, especially the non-crime related SE, which is of greatest interest from an economic policy point of view, tends to be considerably lower than suggested by other studies that use the currency method, including Mimic models. In scenario III (shown in Thießen, 2010) , which reproduced for Germany and the year 2007 the very large estimate by Schneider et al. (2010) , the assumed currency velocity regarding industrial countries that yielded these large figures was 7.3 times larger than that of scenario I (for developing countries it was 5.6 times larger). However, only the first scenario is consistent with both the micro evidence and the evidence on choosing a plausible income velocity of currency.
The scenarios also demonstrate clear weaknesses of the estimates, since there are relatively similar countries (e.g. France and Germany) with quite different estimated contributions of, for instance, the administrative burden to the SE: one problem causing these anomalies is the given relatively short time period of only 17 years. Hence, again, the scenarios are merely indicative, show the sensitivity to assumptions and point to the need for more discussions of potential causes of the SE and their quantifications.
Policy Implications
The publicized statements by some OECD governments about relatively high assumed revenue losses due to the SE suggest that previous high estimates of the size of the shadow economy have had their impact. 19 But considering the micro evidence (Appendix 2) and scenario I, it is not surprising that the government responses such as more controls, higher punishment for tax and other violations etc., did not yield the expected additional revenues. Instead the new controls, auditing, and court proceedings caused substantial costs. Note that these costs usually do not include costs for damages to businesses and people caused by unwarranted prosecutions, which may create new adverse incentives to economic agents. Also not considered are the potential costs due to reduced intrinsic motivation to pay taxes. Hence, the question is which adverse effects higher controls and punishment levels have? 20 However, even if the SE is relatively small in most industrialized OECD countries, policy-makers may nevertheless want to reduce it. The foregoing results and their evaluation suggest alternatives to expensive controls and punishment, i.e. a comprehensive set of reforms of incentives, if reforms influence the perceptions of economic agents: for space reasons we mention briefly a few and refer to the details in Thießen (2010, pp. 41-43) .
Political System
Introduce elements of direct democracy (e.g. referenda) where participation of taxpayers appears warranted and feasible. 19 In 2006, Germany's Finance Ministry published the figure of ¤70 billion of revenue losses due to the SE (> 3% of GDP), which equals 20% of the estimated value of the SE of Schneider et al.
(2010) of more than ¤350 billion. The measures taken by OECD governments against the SE are described, for instance, in Williams et al. (2008) , and for Austria and Germany in Feld and Schneider (2010) . 20 Feld and Larsen (2006) found that there is no statistically significant effect of higher controls and punishment on the SE. Given the cited experimental literature on social interactions, fairness and reciprocity effects, it is possible that higher controls and punishment levels, especially if they exceed a certain threshold level, have adverse effects, for instance, on the willingness of economic agents to voluntarily accept a given relatively high tax level. 500 U. Thießen
Tax and Transfer System
Simplify the tax system through introducing a neutral corporate and personal income tax, i.e. an allowance for corporate equity and regarding personal income taxation, a simple consumption tax in the form of an income tax with a sufficiently high allowance for capital income (to reduce intertemporal distortions caused by double taxation of capital income and taxation of nominal interest income). The reform can be cost neutral through a broadening of the tax base.
Other Institutional and Subjective Influences
Improve evaluation methods of the quality of government with the prime goal of reducing political and other corruption at all government levels; augment the concept of GDP by indicators of life satisfaction; 21 improve the evaluations of the quality of public goods and services (e.g. use information provided by users 22 ) among other suggestions.
Concluding Remarks
Our results include a first time estimate of the organized-crime related shadow economy and estimated robust effects of a large array of influences on the SE of which many appear to be quantitatively at least as relevant as standard causes of unofficial activity (the tax and regulatory burden). This indirectly confirms the hypothesis for the standard causes of the SE to be conditional: a relatively high tax level may be associated with a relatively small SE depending on other factors. In our analysis most of these other relevant factors may well be affected by governments. Hence there would be ample room for governments to influence the SE by other means than through taxation, the administrative burden, labor market regulation, and/or controls and punishment. Many of the robust influences confirm new theoretical and experimental evidence on reciprocity.
We also find that the relatively large estimated sizes of the SE on the basis of macro models (currency or Mimic models) stem from using a relatively high assumed income velocity of the currency used in the SE. 23 But a relatively low velocity can be much better defended, since the role of currency in income generation is small and diminishes. And assuming a relatively low income velocity, such as that of M2, yields estimates of the SE that are consistent with the micro evidence: the size of the SE in industrialized countries is then merely a few percent of official GDP. 21 Note that life satisfaction and happiness tend to reduce the SE, but a high degree of 'happiness' is not a sufficient condition for a relatively low SE. 22 Introduce intelligent evaluation, for instance, by systematically collecting and using valuable information such as that of the reasons for change of schools. 23 As stated above, Mimic models yield an index whose transformation into actual estimated ratios of the SE to GDP requires using other such estimated ratios, which are usually taken from currency models where the assumed velocity is not made explicit. Hence, Mimic model results -as those of currency models -depend crucially on the velocity assumption.
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The often published relatively high estimates of the SE on the basis of macro models have had their effect on governments such that they believed that it would be possible to raise enormous additional revenues through increasing both controls and punishment levels. But they yielded miniscule revenues while causing sizable new expenditures and potential other intangible costs, which have not yet been analyzed. However, this divergence between expectations and facts does not appear to have led to conclusions yet.
Appendix 1. The Assumption of Income Velocity of Currency Used in the SE
The assumed value of income velocity of currency is crucial because the estimates of the SE are directly proportional and thus extremely sensitive to it.
Currency velocity in the official economy is obtained by dividing official GDP by currency in circulation (velocity = official GDP/currency).
Previous studies estimating the size of the SE argued that since the velocity of currency in the SE is difficult to estimate and as long as there is no better knowledge about velocity of currency in general, one has to accept the assumption of 'equal' currency velocity in the official and unofficial economy (e.g. Schneider, 1986, p. 665) . Schneider (2007, p. 31) argues that one has to accept the assumption of 'equal' money velocity in both sectors. But it is unclear which 'money' is meant, i.e. whether it is currency or which monetary aggregate.
For the following reasons this assumption needs to be discussed.
• Official GDP always includes some estimate of unofficial GDP (e.g. unofficial production in agriculture is included in official GDP, because agricultural GDP is calculated by multiplying all farmland by average price, e.g. Braakmann, 2004) . Hence, if this estimate of unofficial activity is deducted from official GDP and the resulting 'official transactions GDP' divided by currency, we obtain a corrected official velocity figure smaller than official velocity. • Most importantly, however, and stressed by few authors such as Breusch (2005b, p. 33) and Hill (2002) , the assumption of equality ignores that currency represents a very small part in the money supply of the official economy: For instance, currency to M2 ratios in 2007 in the industrial countries of our sample stood between merely 1% in Iceland and 11.2% in Italy! Regarding the developing countries in our sample this ratio in 2007 stood between 6.6% in Turkey and 17.1% in Bulgaria. Hence, using the official GDP velocity of currency would be an extreme assumption which vastly overstates the function of currency and transmits this mistake to the estimates of the SE. • There is also a long-term trend decline in income velocities of broad monetary aggregates, which is true for all countries except Korea, where it is relatively stable, and two Eastern European countries, which are special cases due to transition. During the past three decades the scissor between velocity of currency and that of broad monetary aggregates widened: today in most industrial countries M2 velocity is merely 3 to 10% of currency velocity. In Iceland and the UK it is merely about 2%. Hence, estimates based on currency velocity can be reduced by this large proportion if one gives M2 velocity preference on the grounds discussed above. A decade ago there was an intense debate on estimates of the shadow economy for Canada, summarized by Hill (2002) . On the basis of this debate Hill suggested the income velocity of currency to lie in a range of 2 to 4. Like Klovland (1984) he also proposed to provide several estimates. Thus, he argued that Schneider's estimate for the Canadian underground economy in 1996 of about 15% of official GDP would instead be 2-4% of GDP (Hill, 2002 (Hill, , p. 1649 . This corresponds well to a later estimate of the maximum potential underground activity by Statistics Canada (2006) . Given the strong long run decline in income velocities of broad monetary aggregates, Hill's suggested velocity range would correspond today to a range of 1-3. And this corresponds well to our first scenario, scenario I, Appendix 3. • Non-cash payments are used for transactions in the SE for several reasons. The SE will adapt to regulations preventing money laundering through elaborate means to circumvent these rules. The sheer number of electronic payments may prevent a gapless control and auditing, which may also prove too expensive. • Velocities jump largely from country to country even among otherwise similar ones. These differences are not well understood and have not been clarified.
There are a few analyses of velocity (e.g. Porter & Judson, 1996) , which identify major determinants, such as the interest rate, inflation, ratio of revenue to GDP as a proxy for underground activity, violent crime, non-cash payments, ATMs, and largest denomination of domestic currency in circulation. In an own analysis nearly all of these variables turn out to be statistically significant with expected signs. But differences in these determinants between countries such as, for instance, UK, France, and Germany appear to be minor. And even if, for instance, the use of non-cash payments is higher in the UK than in Germany, the reasons for this are unclear. So we still have little explanation for the large velocity differences. • The own analysis of currency velocity largely confirmed the findings of Porter and Judson (1996) , but is also not able to solve our problem: specifically, we ran for our sample a regression of currency velocity (with currency being adjusted for currency holdings abroad) against real GDP per capita in purchasing power parity, the short term interest rate, CPI inflation, the ratio of total government revenues to GDP, business cost of corruption, administrative burden, organized crime, dummy for frequency of wage payments, dummy for the largest denomination of domestic currency in circulation, and credit cards per capita. The total number of countries that have these data is 26 and the regression performs quite well, explaining about 82% of the total variation in currency velocity. Statistically significant factors that increase velocity are the interest rate and inflation (because they are the opportunity cost of holdings currency), frequency of wage payments and credit cards per capita (because they both lower currency demand and thus increase velocity). All other independent variables are statistically insignificant, although most of them have the expected sign. Hence, this analysis provides one reason for the dramatic difference of velocities between otherwise similar countries: credits cards per capita are much higher in the UK than either in France or Germany. But why is this so? • Given these facts, we produced the following velocity assumptions. First we established clusters of countries that we consider relatively similar. These are
The Shadow Economy in International Comparison 505 industrial countries including EMU, on the one hand, and other developing countries, including our eastern European counties, on the other hand. Thus, we used averages of velocities of these two country groups. Second, owing to the trend in velocities only the last available year 2007 was used. Third, from the above it appears that currency is much more an extreme than M2. Hence, our range of velocities used to calculate three scenarios is given by M2 velocity, on the one end, and a weighted currency-M1 velocity, where M1 is weighted 75% and currency 25%, on the other hand. These latter weights allowed us to reproduce the very large estimated size of the SE for Germany in 2007 calculated by Schneider et al. (2010) , namely 16.7% of official GDP and the averages of the estimated SE sizes are roughly equal in both studies regarding those countries for which estimates were produced here. Three scenarios were thus calculated:
• scenario I: income velocity of M2 (see Appendix 3 below, scenario I),
• scenario II: income velocity of M1 (see underlying discussion paper, Table 10 ), • scenario III: income velocity is 75% M1 velocity and 25% currency velocity (see underlying discussion paper, Table 11 ).
Without using averages, the differences in the estimates of the SE would be implausibly large among otherwise similar countries due to jumps in the respective velocity from country to country. Hence, it is surprising how, in studies that produce estimates of the SE for many countries, these estimates are not fluctuating widely, although the velocities of these countries are extremely different. Presumably, these studies used either an average velocity of all countries or they applied the velocity of one country for all. But the approach chosen is not explained. Finally, monetary aggregates for which velocities were calculated, i.e. currency and M1, were both adjusted for estimated currency holdings abroad, meaning that velocities are slightly higher than without this adjustment.
Appendix 2. Which Velocity Assumption is Consistent with the Micro Evidence?
We can compare the resulting estimates of the size of the SE with micro evidence from surveys and other sources. The following summary of selected micro evidence, irrespective of the source, suggests for the industrial countries that shadow economic activity, including crime-related activity, has merely a potential maximum of up to a few percent of GDP. Hence, this corresponds on average best to our scenario I and thus to income velocity of M2 (see Appendix 3 below, scenario I).
Size of Crime-related Activities
Statistics Canada (2006) cites evidence of the early 1990s for several countries:
• For Canada, drug-related activities were estimated at 0.3% to 0.6% of GDP.
To this Statistics Canada was adding an allowance for other illegal goods and services to arrive at an estimated 1% of GDP for illegal production and services. • For France, evidence is cited that illegal activity amounted to 0.1% of GDP.
• For the USA, illegal activity was estimated at 1.5% of GDP noting that more things are illegal in the US than in many other OECD countries and that drugs is still essentially an American problem. Derek Blades of the UN commission of Europe is cited: 'For these reasons it can be asserted with some degree of confidence that for most OECD countries the inclusion of illegal production in GDP could not possibly add more than 1% and, on the evidence from France, probably much less than this'. • For Germany the damage of illegal activity is estimated at 0.4% of GDP (¤11 billion in 2008, see Bundeskriminalamt, 2008, p. 64) .
This suggests that the estimates of crime-related shadow economic activity shown in Appendix 3, scenario I, which is based on M2 velocity, are already relatively high, although this is the lowest velocity of the discussed range. Hence, to obtain estimates of the crime-related shadow economy -using the money demand method -consistent with the micro evidence suggests using a velocity of M2 or lower.
Plausibility Calculations of Shadow Economic Activity
Since the 1990s, Statistics Canada performed an item by item analysis of potentially missing underground transactions and concluded that a maximum potential for the SE in Canada would be 5.2% of official GDP (Statistics Canada, 2006) . This consists of a maximum of 2.7% value of underground production (which, however, is not actually missing because otherwise it would be added to official GDP as stressed by Statistics Canada), a maximum of 1% of illegal production activity, and a maximum of 1.5% of undeclared income for tax purposes, which is nevertheless recorded for national accounts. For Germany, simple plausibility calculations show that estimates of the SE of 16% of official GDP are beyond any credibility. For 2010 this equals about ¤390 billion which is the value of 1000 soccer stadiums each year (e.g. Munich soccer stadium of 2005 at a cost of ¤350 million). This estimate is also equivalent to ¤9070 earned in the SE each year by each employed and unemployed person (43 million people). Or at an average wage of ¤10 per hour this means that each of these 43 million people would work in the SE each year 907 hours, equivalent to working each of the 52 weekends per year, both days almost 9 hours. Since, for Germany, less than 10% of the population in the 18-74 year group stated that they have carried out black market activities, the number of people would reduce to about less than 7 million but this includes those who worked only once or very few times in the shadow. It is possible that people think shadow activities include do-it-yourself production, which is wrong. Thus, the number of people working regularly underground must be much smaller. Just to make an assumption, we assume this number to be half, i.e. 3.5 million. If black market activities in a narrow sense constitute about 50% of total shadow economic activity (an implicit assumption by Enste & Schneider, 2006, p. 188) , i.e. 0.5 × 390 = ¤195 billion, then each of these about 3.5 million people would earn about ¤56,000 a year or ¤4640 each month. But there would be an additional ¤195 billion earned by other entities including crime. Considering (a) how well companies are monitored by
The Shadow Economy in International Comparison 507 tax investigators and by the special police force against shadow economic activity, (b) that the number of persons is relatively small who are related to crime, and (c) the unwillingness of people to take the relatively high risk of being detected, caused, for instance, by the invitation of the State to report anonymously tax offenses, the resulting number of entities earning these ¤195 billion is accordingly small. Even if it would be as large as 1 million, just to make an assumption, each of them would earn ¤190,000 year after year unnoticed by the auditors and special police.
Even if this would be credible, a production of this magnitude (1000 soccer stadiums each year) could not go unnoticed by the population. But how can then the special police force ('Finanzkontrolle Schwarzarbeit') established by the Finance Ministry in 2004 of nearly 7000 officers at a cost of about ¤500 million per year not be able to detect this kind of production? It detected only a tiny fraction of it, namely about ¤600 million in alleged damages per year including fines (0.015% of the ¤390 billion), of which, however, only about ¤50 million were actually raised (Deutscher Bundestag, 2008) . For further plausibility checks concerning Germany see Koch (2007) and Graf (2007) . Koch (2007) provides a detailed assessment that also shows that the estimate of 16% SE relative to official GDP for Germany is not credible.
Micro Survey Evidence
The national surveys of living standards and working conditions of the population mostly include questions regarding additional business, part-time work or moonlighting, but such work includes legal and officially registered and taxed part-time work so it cannot be interpreted as black market or shadow economic activity.
However, there are few valuable surveys concerned only with shadow economic activity. For Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, Germany and the United Kingdom, the Rockwool Foundation carried out such a survey in 2001, which was repeated for Germany in 2004 (Pedersen, 2003 Feld & Larsen, 2005; . Black market activities as a ratio to official GDP were estimated for Denmark to have been 1.8%, Norway 1.1%, Sweden 1.0%, Germany 1.3% and UK 0.6%.
The proportion of the population in the 18-74 age group who stated that they have carried out black activities within the last 12 months (which may have been only once) was between 20% in Denmark, 17% in Norway, 11% in Sweden, 10 in Germany and 8% in the UK.
The results for Germany in the years 2004-2006 show a decreasing trend in this participation to below 9% as well as in the estimated ratio of the SE to official GDP. This ratio was estimated for 2001 at 1.4%, for 2004 at 1%, and for 2006 below 1%. However, in Feld and Larsen (2006) and in Feld (2010) larger ratios of estimated black activities to GDP are also presented, namely 4% in 2001 decreasing to 2.5% in 2006. Graf (2007) criticizes the reason for these higher numbers, namely the assumption of the authors that had black market activities taken place in official markets, their value could have been three times as high. This may be incorrect due to the budget constraints of market participants. Also 508 U. Thießen the emphasis by Feld and Larsen (2005) that their estimates may be lower limits of the black market economy are criticized, because:
• it is not clear that respondents under-report activities, • there are questions regarding the role of answers in the estimates where respondents may have been active in the black market economy only once or very few times in a year, • one cannot exclude that respondents included in their answers activities that are not black market activities, such as engagements in neighborly help, membership associations, honorary offices, etc. (Graf, 2007) .
Germany established in 2004 a special police force of nearly 7000 officers with the sole task of uncovering shadow economic activity (the so-called 'Finanzkontrolle Schwarzarbeit') as a subunit of customs under the supervision of the Finance Ministry. 24 The costs of this police force are about ¤500 million per year and despite large monetary targets for each officer concerning underground activity to be uncovered, the final revenues generated by this task force are miniscule. According to an analysis by the national court of auditors (Deutscher Bundestag, 2008) the pension system received only 1.7% of the allegedly uncovered losses, the tax system received 4.4% of uncovered losses and of the levied fines only 22% were actually paid. This suggests that the police, bureaucracies and courts were busy but with little result.
Overall, the court of auditors estimates that only about 8% of all losses allegedly uncovered by the task force (of about ¤600 million in 2006 including fines) is generated as actual revenue (about ¤50 million in 2006). But this does not account for the considerable but unknown costs incurred by the justice system due to the large number of initiated prosecutions that failed in courts and other costs, such as lost working hours and lost reputation of businesses and persons that were indicted but found innocent. Nobody estimated these costs. There is no evidence about the efficacy of this task force. The court of auditors criticized the supervisory authority, the Finance Ministry, for not initiating an analysis of the efficacy of this expensive unit. The statistics prepared by the unit do not allow inferences about the size of the total shadow economy. 24 The officers were former border customs officers but in this function redundant after accession of Eastern European countries to the EU.
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Appendix 3. Regression Results of Currency to M2 Functions
Scenario I of the size of the shadow economy (SE) and individual causes (using average M2 velocity) 1/(in percent of official GDP) 1/Velocity assumption of currency used in the unofficial economy: average of M2 velocities of two country groups: industrial countries, including EMU countries: 1.48; for developing countries, including Eastern Europe: 2.07. Note: Given very large differences in velocities even among otherwise relatively similar countries, which are not well understood and have not been clarified, we used the average velocity of two country groups: EMU countries and other industrial countries, on the one hand, and Eastern European and developing countries, on the other hand. The velocity used for each country is the average velocity of the country group to which it belongs. Not using averages would result in implausibly severe divergence of the estimates of the SE among otherwise similar countries. In addition, since velocities of monetary aggregates of most countries exhibit marked time trends, only values of 2007 were used. Finally, monetary aggregates were both adjusted for estimated currency holdings abroad, meaning that velocities are slightly higher than without this adjustment. Source: own calculations.
